South Sudan: Elections Won’t End in ‘Miraculously’ Having Democracy, South Sudan Needs a Vision

Welcome to allAfrica’s Silencing The Guns series where we focus on peacebuilding on the continent. I’m Mantsadi Sepheka from allAfrica. And today our focus is South Sudan.
Africa’s youngest independent state has been plagued by chronic instability since gaining its independence a decade ago. civil society groups have called on the country’s government to step down as South Sudan deals with what Amnesty International is calling a new wave of repression. Now in this wave of repression, authorities are targeting the right to freedom of expression.
Activists, journalists and pro democracy employees have been arrested in the government crackdown.
Now let’s welcome Dr. Andrew Tchie, a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. At that institute he works on stabilisation, peace operations, peacebuilding and security systems in sub-Saharan Africa. He also coordinates Training for Peace in Africa Programme with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the Institution for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa, and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and works with the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Dr. Andrew has written several papers focusing on South Sudan struggles with democracy stability and peace. Welcome Dr. Andrews to allAfrica Silencing The Guns series.

Dr Tchie: Thank you very much.

Um, let’s start with you telling us more about your involvement in the training peace project.

Dr Tchie: So I joined the training fees project, which is a programme designed to support the African continent for the EU, African Union and other regional bodies. It’s been going on the programme has been going on for 26 years, and it’s one of Norway’s flagships programmes that is designed to build and support the African continent, which is mostly focused on I would argue, African solutions to African problems. So really here, it’s about how do we support the visions, the ideas, and the steps that Africa and African leaders want to take to move the country forward? So that’s the large part of what we do. Obviously, it’s a partnership between free organisations, I don’t speak on behalf of any of them, but it’s between ACCORD in South Africa, IISS and NUPI, in Norway.

And just in your opinion, now, starting with the South Sudan issue, can a country like South Sudan successfully emerge from conflict?

Dr Tchie: Yes, having any country can emerge from conflict, if it has the right ingredients to be able to do that. And what I mean by ingredients, I mean, one, the vision and the necessary leadership to deliver on that vision to the right institutional and governance structures that help guide that country and the parties that are as part of that leadership. Moving the country forward, it needs to have accountability to the people. So as part of that vision, accountability to what it is doing, and how we enact laws enshrines things and is able to use that vision to propel people to invest. And what I mean by invest is see that vision of unity and I think that was one of the things that the SPLA, which is the South Sudanese liberation movement or army … did have in the early 80s, this idea of how do we collectively we have one Sudan, how do we move the country forward? How do we deal with the grievances, but also how do we move the country into a people-focused in this case, moving away from military regimes, and more focused on liberating the country and being able to achieve ultimate goal and using, I would argue some of the natural resources that already exists in South Sudan to be able to propel the country into fully fledged African democracy and I use the word or the term African democracy here. Because I think it’s important, Western notions of democracy have not worked. One could argue liberal peace. So for me what I what I think is key is that Africans should own their own type of democracy that works a deal for them. Now that might have resemblance from some western states, but not necessarily. The models are important. It’s something that is unique to the African continent, unique to the situation, and unique to the people that govern the situation.

So on that point, I know you mentioned that that investing in unity would be one of the priorities that they should look at Sudan and South Sudan, but are there any other challenging aspects in trying to build peace in that country?

Dr Tchie: What I think is one problem has always been that there any incident if you know the focus is also on here. But one of the things is that if you look towards Sudan, its historical nature, what you see mimics in South Sudan. And what I mean by that is, the governance systems is slightly different. But what you have is very similar. So the elites control the central, control resources and plunder from the peripheries. That’s no different from Bashir and those leaders that were before him. But you see the same thing happening in South Sudan, where you have a central leadership, sort of many of sort of in the West have argued this big tent approach, where you try and welcome everyone in and then you allow them to be able to plan their resources based upon your own interest as a way of keeping the people at ease. Now, in South Sudan’s case, you still see that now taking place. And what has lacked what has been lacking in South Sudan has been that leadership that takes the country forward that says, okay, we’ve had a conflict since 2013. But here is the vision of a New South Sudan, this is what it’s going to look like, this is what we want it to do. But because that political space has been engulfed, I would argue from the 80s, not just by the SPLA or M, the movement itself in the political party, but also by the actual military component of the SPLA, and the bind-up of to a degree resources, you could argue, by a military means. It has meant that there are no political parties that exist, that can be able to not necessarily infiltrate, but also occupy that space. And so what you have is pretty much military leaders. And we see this in Africa, particularly in the in the 60s and 70s, when a lot of African countries, the first lead is like Kwame Nkrumah, in Ghana, where I’m from, were taken over by military means. And what I mean by that is coups, and you see, these military leaders who come in, take control, oftentimes are very military focus or heavy sort of securitized focus, which naturally they are, but don’t have the political means to move the country forward. And so you have these stalemates that take place in the 70s and 80s and 90s, you have people like John Kufuor from Ghana, Obasanjo from Nigeria, who sort of take over, but also try and transition African countries, particularly in West Africa, into more democratic norms.
And so in South Sudan’s case, you haven’t had that you haven’t had a situation where the political, to coin a phrase, elites have been able to take control of the country. But what you do have is still military people in control, military who have been in conflict since the 80s. Some, even since the 70s. Since then, they are a group that formed the nine one and two. And so what you don’t have is the political space or capital, to be able to have these conversations and debates without military and security control. What you are seeing from the young South Sudanese is this willingness to engage in debate and discussion, which is good, but also to full force, I would argue some of the military components within the South Sudan to, to move on to think about debates to want that change. And I think that is what I inherently see as that not necessarily just governance gap, but that political gap that exists. Politics is still ruled by the barrel of the gun, and not actually by debate and discussion. And so the young people who are protesting now are trying to fill that void with that discussion. So the hope is, one would hope that you could reduce the levels of violence that you see. And that transition occur into more political parties that evolve for movements that occupy that space that has been filled by the military, but that will take time. And those groups will go through divisions or fragments, as always, and naturally as human beings when we disagree. But that space is what I’m saying needs to be filled politically, that allows South Sudan to move forward.
If not, you still will have military means as a solution to political issues. And that as we know, only produces more violence but also this when that violence is perpetuated across the country, it becomes more and more disaggregated. What I mean that it is by disaggregated is as the two parties in the conflict resolve the issues from 2017 and 18 and we have the revitalised peace agreement, what you see is more localised conflict, because all of these groups and these militias, this committees, and then you have this aggregated local violence that starts to increase. But nobody’s dealing with anything because as I said, that political realm or that leadership realm at the local level has been filled by, yes, Pele, since the 80s, and has destroyed because of conflict destroyed many of the local structures or governance systems that were in place. And what I mean by that is local leaders who come together in the committee to resolve differences that has actually been dissolved to a certain extent in certain areas in particular.

And just touching on your point about the youth being more involved now, are they actually been given the or allowed the platform to, to debate and discuss the governance issue in South Sudan?

Dr Tchie: I would argue, your opening suggests there has been a lot of crackdown that is taking place by the state, yes, on the youth . And so this is something that we see ongoing, I think what is different now than it was in the 80s, and 90s, not just in South Sudan, but across Sub Saharan Africa. And sorry to draw on that, because I think that’s important is you have now have online media. So people are taking to Twitter, people are taking to Facebook, people are taken to other platforms to say, what should be done. And that is unique in itself, because the state, necessarily can’t govern that, it doesn’t have the systems to be able to government that, even Western democracies, you cannot govern that, apart from shutting down the Internet access. And that’s the only way in which you can do that in South Sudan. And again, there are suggestions more recently that that has taken place, that was leading up to the more recent declare protests. So what I’m saying is there is more scope now to be able to do that.
However, doing that online is very different than doing that politically in person and bringing together more people. So what I mean by that is, yes, online, that is good. And that is an active part of being engaged. But it also needs to be backed up backed up by realities on the ground. And what I mean by that is, when you have that space to be able to show solidarity on a on a political, political or a social issue, and present that in numbers, then that starts to put pressure on on the government to change into look at alternative ways. Now, governments have an option to either one respond to that court, not just by the, by the youth, but also by people, or in this case, sometimes women as well who are also champion these means that we see in Sudan, or they can use repression, and oftentimes, repression will work in the short term. But in the long term, what we see in pretty much most western but also an African Sub Saharan African states is suppression only works for a certain amount of time. Now it might go on and on and on and on. But over time, people then start to take up arms, as you see in eastern part of DRC rebel groups and militia form, and then you have insecurity across the state. So in South Sudan’s case, what you are, what we have now is that tipping point, we’re at that tipping point where we can either go down, bloodshed, you know, massive all-out war, if things continue down this road, which is highly unlikely, but something that is still on the table. You have more youth uprisings that link with women’s groups and rights groups and civil society organisations, i.e. the church, similar to what you saw in DRC, in the early 2000s 2010 2013, which then forge or push government to act or the state goes on repression route. So those are the sorts of free alternatives, not necessarily fixed, but free options that I think South Sudan is facing at the moment. And one would obviously prefer that youth, women and society organisations can come together to be able to form their own movements and move the country forward.
But as you know, it’s always down to how the elites govern within the centre in this case in Juba, so time will tell but as you see in Sudan itself of the last decades, few decades, what you end up happening in the end in 2019, in April was protests that led to the fall of the regime. And then this sort of instability occurred between elites that are taking place so I always say you know South Sudan the moment yes while youth are doing what they’re doing, and women are protesting and at the, at the helm of this and church and organisation And moving things forward, when really, if the elites, who are even associated to the government, are affected. And what I mean by this is when I mean this is most people when the elites are affected, and it starts to impact their pockets, that is when you start to see more movement, because then it’s actually the elites who are connected to us have been disconnected to the regime are the ones who connect with that social movement, and then propel more of the movement to move forward.

You make very valid points there, Dr. Andrew. Um, so to those who are listening to this podcast, you’re listening to the allAfrica Silencing The Guns podcast series on peacebuilding on the continent. And we are in conversations, Dr. Andrew Tchie, senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Dr. Andrew, I just like you to take us back a decade ago, you know, when South Sudan gained its independence, and of course, the many peace deals that followed. What has the main point of contention been in South Sudan?

Dr Tchie: I think a large part initially was that the parties didn’t agree. And what I mean by parties is, it’s the way in which things were people were being governed or systems being governed. I mean, that has been a large part of it, there’s been, I would argue, the 2015 agreement in particular, was one which I think western states were just trying to defuse the violence. And so what you see happening is some form of agreement put in place when the situation or the moment as we call it in peace studies, was not ripe enough to be enable the parties to want to settle the agreement. And so you see the outburst in 2016 diffused down, or shall I say dies on in 2017, to an extent. And we are where we are now. So I think what you see is, it’s partly the disagreements about how and the ways in which you, one should govern. There’s obviously disagreements around what has been done in terms of empowering and using the resources that existed in the country to be able to enable and empower not just the government, but also the people to move the country forward.
Largely, as we have seen in South Sudan, a lot of that oil money has been plundered. And the government hasn’t been able to find alternative measures or alternative means to not just govern, but also to empower the people economically. And this is disheartening, because if you look at places like Yambio, in the south or the Equatoria regions, before the outbreaks of violence, they were relatively calm, there was local tensions and whatnot, maybe local land disputes or community violence, but nothing on the scale that you have now. And so a landowner or an area that was quite fertile, and pretty much if you go back to the 70s, 60s, 70s, that region was pretty much could have fed the whole of the Horn of Africa. But we’re now in a situation where that actual region isn’t being able to produce the goods or being able to produce the necessary food to even feed itself and the country is now more dependent on aid than it is on its own green land to be able to exist. And so that is, is concerning. And then you add on things like climate change, and the impact of climate change in adverse effects that is happening between herders and farmers. This changes in seasons and patterns and weather patterns in temperatures rising. And floods that are taking place in more recently flooded, have hit various parts of South Sudan, all of these things exacerbate the conflict.
And again, I go back to my earlier point, if the the leadership doesn’t have the vision, doesn’t have the willingness and desire to bring the country forward, to put people on that path to democracy through that vision for what it tries to change through the institutional systems that it needs to put in place, then you just perpetuate and delay one step to democracy, but also the latent conflicts that exist in the countries itself. I think what is important to, to also talk about here is also the type of agreements that are put in place. Now that the agreements, in essence, try a quite comprehensive, they try and hold parties accountable. But in the revitalised version of disagreements, what we see is that the parties themselves are accountable to themselves. And in this case, what I mean by that is oftentimes you might have the UN monitoring or a country or neighbouring countries holding the country accountable or the parties accountable to the agreement. In this case, this is the deadline, you meet the deadline, we move on to the next step. In the revised agreement, you don’t have that, it’s really down to the government to be able to facilitate that. And that in itself is a concern, because the state isn’t set up that way to be able to do that. And what I mean by set up is, it had some institutional systems in the 70s, when it was governance on in the late 70s. But apart from that period, it’s had consistent violence and conflict. And so there’s the systems that were in place, colonial period to the 70s, a largely been covered by the SPLA.
And what I mean by that point of they have been one’s governing. So the local systems that were in place, the local leadership, have all been diffused, because the SPLA has been the structure that has been in place. And because that has been in place for so long. Largely, it’s still free, that military means that is governing the country. And so what you don’t have is systems of governing the country that enable people locally to be able to do what they want to do to move things forward. Now, some of that is still in existence in some areas, for example, the sugar kingdom, and certain parts of Equatoria but largely speaking, most of those traditional systems have been, have broken, and so you’re trying to then rebuild institutions and systems, again, through the leadership who are military. And so that in itself, lacks because you still need the technical know-how, and that technical know-now doesn’t always sit with the military quite well. It sits with civilians.
And so this is why I’m saying when you have uprisings from the youth who are, you know, have gone to neighbouring countries, maybe like Uganda, or Kenya, or, you know, have lived in the US, UK, Australia and have the technical abilities to be able to move the country forward but are not empowered to do that, then you just perpetuate the situation, because in essence, it’s still the military guys who are in charge. And we see this across Sub Saharan Africa, South Sudan is not the only country that is susceptible to this issue. In Sudan, you see the same issue that is going on, that has taken place there. We see again, in agreement that is put together, that is in essence, on paper, it works really well. But in practical terms, it’s very difficult because you have these large regimes who have taken control and dominate the area. In Chad, we see the same issue. in Mali, we see the same issue. So again, it’s not just the I’m not saying I’m blaming these agreements, but what we’ve seen is these transitional agreements that oftentimes are quite comprehensive. And again, it’s important that they are comprehensive, but oftentimes, holding the parties to account is lacking, contributes to this issue that we see across the continent as well.

Now, we know that, that the country recently marked I mean, touching on the fragility of these peace agreements, because it sounds to me what you’re explaining that obviously, they’re all very different. And while they look great on paper, to actually execute what’s in the agreement has been quite a difficult move. So the you know, recently more three years since various faction signed the peace deal with President Salva Kiir’s government, and there are peace monitors that say or warned that the country’s running out of time to make key reforms needed to avoid a future war. In your opinion, is the best the best solution to reach some kind of stability. What is the best solution rather?

Dr Tchie: I think that I mean, the original agreement in itself on passage, as I said, no, as you have said, restated, these these agreements on paper are good. I think what South Sudan, in essence, I think, yes, you can do, but you need to switch or South Sudan needs to switch away from just the military government. To some, I would argue, no laughs I’ve recently written a paper on this, that it needs more civilian components. And what I mean by this is, I’m not saying look, let’s look to Sudan, but you need an agreement, which has more civilian aspects. And it needs to be people centred at the heart of the original agreement in 2015 and the revised agreement in 2018. It’s it focuses on the leaders, and in this case, the elites and in this case, the military. What it doesn’t do is focus on how the civilian components or civilian society organisations, women’s groups will be included and will tackle this issue as leaders themselves. So for example, it’s all good saying well, we have the head of Parliament, legislative parliament and Vice President, sorry, vice president who’s a woman and for example, the Ministry of Defence is a woman, that that is all good. But these are elite women. Yeah. These are women who are known to be part of the elites, and not people sent in and what I mean by people, it’s not governed by the people that actually have the issues that are the ones who are fighting it. And what I mean fighting, I mean, the people at the local level. So for example, where are the leaders from the sugar committee that are governing themselves and their own area about making decisions about what they want to do? Now, that is a question of what type of federalism South Sudan wants to have.
But this all out sort of, okay, we are the SPLA, we control, we govern, isn’t working, because again, there are local problems and local issues that the people in those areas know how to deal with. But if they’re not given the money and the resources to be able to deal with that, then how you as a person and leader in let’s say, Juba are going to solve those issues. If you only fly in once a year, you don’t understand that. In addition to that, you then have the governors who are appointed by the president, who are part of the the the army, again, military government, people who are selected and part of the governorship again, yes, they might have some context, but they’re not the people from these areas, in some places they are, but in large part, the President has been able to fire and hire whatever he wants, and whenever he wants, they’re not locally elected. So again, you isolate the people who are going through these issues, by putting in place the very same people that they have issue with or might take issue with, because they don’t focus on the local dynamics and issues.
And so someone like myself, who used to work for the UN goes to these local areas, tries engage with them, and then tries to, you know, advocate on behalf of the people about to the governor about what is going on, the government can’t connect to what’s happening, because in essence, he focuses more on the party. It’s focused on making sure that those in Juba are appeased, and to an extent, make sure him and his people around him are happy. So it’s not people-centred, it’s not focused on dealing with the root causes of local conflict. It’s not dealing with how do we empower and use the resources locally to empower people to expand up and scale up the work in the efforts that we’re trying to do. So in essence, what you have is those people who have been placed there who are linked to the elites, and leadership in Juba, but actually don’t resonate with the people on the ground. And so you perpetuate the same issue again, and again, again. Now, what I’m arguing for, and what many have said before me is you have to reverse that.
Let’s invest in local, let’s empower the local, to be able to have the capacity to build, but also to be self sustainable, because if not, what we’re going to have is a country that is the youngest, that had the money to be able to empower itself, but in essence, will rely more on aid to build its own future. And that in itself is not an Africa or South Sudan that we want. It’s not helpful. It’s not beneficial, because in essence, what you have is constant aid. And when the shift focuses away from South Sudan on to another country, then what does South Sudan do? How does it move itself forward? If it’s dependent on aid?

Absolutely, I mean, I totally agree with you there. And you know, sticking on to the staying with the point of leadership, I saw reports of the appointment of two women to senior leadership positions within South Sudan’s transitional national legislature. Is this a step in the right direction, considering what you said in terms of how the country needs to move forward to create stability?

Dr Tchie: I think it’s I don’t think it’s a it’s a bad move. I think it’s a very good move. And it’s, I mean, look, some people have argued it’s a good sign. I think it’s it’s a good move. I wouldn’t say it’s a good sign. I mean, signs have to be sustained yes. So it’s okay. Yes, you can do that. You’re going to sack the person in three months time because you disagree with them, or because that person pulls you up about something you disagree with, then that’s not a good sign. To me it needs to be sustainable. So yes. On a one on one, sorry, in one regard. Yes. It’s a good sign.
And the other regard, how long will it last for? So for me, yes. But what are the quotas? And I know what I mean, like quotas are in the agreement, I think the initial agreement, it’s at 20%, and it rose to 30%. And I think it might be 35. Don’t quote me on that number. But if women are not participated at that, at that level, then there is a problem because that is what the agreement stipulates. Then there is an issue that I take with okay, yes, it’s fine to have a 45% quota or 5% quota in an agreement. But if those women, again, are women who are purely from Juba governing, then you’re going to have the same issue. And you see this across Africa where in particular places like DRC, you know, you might have a man who is that in a certain part, who dies, and let’s say his wife then takes over that leadership position in that area, and then they use that as I’m making up the numbers.
But South Sudan ends up hand heading down that same path, then what are we doing, we’re just mimicking the levels of elitism from men to women. The number is important, but it shouldn’t be seen as a way to sustain women’s involvement and youth involvement. And what I mean by that is that if we just look at having numbers, and those numbers are made up of elite women, I use example, my country, Ghana, where I’m from, well, for the vast majority of women that are there, or from elite political backgrounds, it doesn’t solve the issue because again, these are not women, locally elected women who represent the countries that they are from, and so you end up perpetuating and shifting, yes, the power from elite men to elite women, but you then you don’t solve the issue. So again, for me, it’s that reversal. How do we do the ground up? How do we get more women locally elected to those positions, nominated those positions, in key positions that support those areas that they’re from, because in essence, they understand what is going on? It’s the same thing, what we have in in, you know, in, we talk about in aid, where people say, you know, when we do training, we must not do any harm. It’s the same thing here. If we’re only thinking about numbers, and okay, we just need to have women, we just need to have women. And that is the only focus, and we don’t move beyond women to local women, then we’re going to have an issue in the next 10, 15 years. And again, you see that in other countries, you see that in DRC, where in the eastern part, women are isolated from the women in Kinshasa, yes, there are women who are in leadership, and some of the I know of and they are amazing, but they don’t resonate to the issues in the eastern part because they’ve grown up in it in Kinshasa or have lived abroad and then come back as part of diaspora. You see that in Somalia, where, for example, in the centre in Mogadishu, it’s focused around the elites, the diaspora. And so you have the diaspora men and women who make up a compose. But the locals are saying, Well hold on, what about us? Why are we in these positions, we know what’s going on locally. And so you have again, this disconnect. And then you have armed groups like Al Shabaab who capitalise on this. And so numbers are good. But numbers are not sustainable in terms of the focuses that they need to put in, particularly if we’re trying to say we need for South Sudan to move into more governance, more accountability, to deal with corruption and all these other issues, then it needs to be localised. It needs to be focused on the people, the people who are most affected, and it needs to be people selected. Not just again, I’m the president, I select the few women – yes, International Committee rubs their hands and says, yes, well done, my good servants, you have met the number. That won’t solve the issue, long term.

Yes, I mean, what you saying is, it sounds like it’s very simple to do, but I guess it takes political will, to do the right thing in order to move forward in these countries. I mean, like you mentioned, a lot of the African countries suffer from the same issues, South Africa included, you know, bringing women into the forefront to do but the right kind of woman, as you say, to deal with these kind of issues and, you know, assist the communities and the communities that they that they know and grew up in, as you mentioned. Um, but let’s move on to the issue of the reopening of the border between Sudan and South Sudan after 11 years. Just your view on whether this will be a positive impact on both countries, or will it have any impact at all?

Dr Tchie: I think it signals not just an attempt to try and unify the two nations and reconcile the differences. But a move that economically will work in both countries’ interest, not just the movement of people, but also the movement of goods. I think if the South Sudan is a landlocked country, and so being able to allow that movement where trade and you know, imports and exports can be done is amazing if it doesn’t, it doesn’t work as against the country, it works in South Sudan’s favour. So for me, that is a positive move and a move that is welcomed. I think issues around IPA need to be sorted issues around how people go back and forth. That the everyday practically of this is going to be important. If issues of conflict between the groups across the border increase, then how do you do that? And what I mean by that, is that not all rebel groups that are part of the or should I say rebel groups who were part of Sudan are part of the Juba peace agreement and so fast tracking or not faster I can, but actually thinking about how we we incorporate those groups is going to be also important to for long-term stability, so away from just economics. Yes, it makes sense, but also for these two countries that have stability. Thinking about those other groups, particularly those SPLA North, or N is also going to be crucial as Parliament’s next step, as the border opens as well.

So I mean, as we wrap up, I just would like your final thoughts on what do you believe should be the next steps to achieving peace? Because are we going to see a fourth agreement in place in order for things to move forward? Because it seems like where they are right now, they’ve stagnated. Where are they? And what do you believe is the next step?

Dr Tchie: Well, I think there are two ways of seeing this. I don’t I wouldn’t say that you can definitely any analyst or every any researcher who say fully This is what’s going to happen. But I think there are things that I would like to see, which is, again, a clear vision, more people-centred focus, more civilians, from those areas. We’ve talked about this earlier in the podcast, people from these areas being able to govern themselves, holding the parties to the agreement accountable. And this, what I mean by this is, if there is parts of the agreement that says, okay, well, the two parties need to form a unified army, then the International Committee and the regional bodies, and the African Union needs to do and put as much pressure on these parties to be able to do that. Because if not, you just have this sort of stagnation and nothing happens and nothing moves forward.
So again, applying the pressure when necessary, to be able to move the country forward is crucial. But that vision, that goal of governance, that goal of what South Sudan will look like needs to be decided. Because going to elections, I think what is key is because we know that at some point, the transitional government will have to come to an end. And then there’s elections, at this stage, go into elections in the next year and a half or two years is nothing but dangerous, because there isn’t a goal, and there aren’t those political parties that are involved. And so for me, what I would like to see is, what does a vision or discussions about a vision of South Sudan look like? How is it going to be governed? How is federalism going to be implemented? What are the political parties that are in that space? And what what are their views? How do you deal with issues of insecurity? How do you deal with economic development? How do you distribute resources that are fair to everybody? Because if South Sudan can’t do that now, heading to elections only means unresolved issues that perpetuate themselves, and you see the same cycle. So you know, we see this in other African countries, which are probably more stronger and economically in a better position than South Sudan. Less so South Sudan. And so the concern now is okay, where we’re heading towards these elections, proposed elections, because that timeframe is done.
And we don’t have a unified army. What do we do? And so for me, those things that I mentioned are crucially important to move South Sudan forward. It’s a discussion that I think the youth have been having, and women and societal organisations have been having. But it’s not one that the government has had of itself. And it’s something that it needs to have, not just with itself as the elites, but with the people of South Sudan, because if they don’t agree on what the next steps look like, then we will have a South Sudan that ends up as it was in 2013 all over again, but with more localised violence and conflict.

Well, we do hope that it doesn’t get to that point. And that solution can be found soon, and that we don’t have to deal with another agreement and that elections can be held in a peaceful manner once an agreement is reached. Thank you so much for your time. Dr. Andrew, I really appreciate it. And your patience. Thank you so much Sir.

Dr Tchie: No problem at all, just lastly if I can add.

Yes, sure.

Dr Tchie: Because it’s important. Elections are not the solution to everything. And I think that’s one of the things that elections are good, because they allow people to vote democratically and make a contribution, to have their say, but elections do not solve issues that are outstanding. And I think one of the things that I mean, you talked about peace agreements and the formation of peace agreements and how they’re quite comprehensive oftentimes fall apart and whatnot. And there is this sort of Western notion that everything needs to be elections. If you have elections, everything will be fine. Yeah. Because elections don’t. I mean, we saw this in Kenya, where you go to elections, but also all the other issues that at that have not been resolved, come to elections, and then they explode.
And so one of the things that, I would argue is that, okay, that vision, that goal, how we govern all of those aspects, faster needs to be on the path leading up to elections, those things needs to be clear, because if not, what happens is, you have these elections, people disagree, because there’s all these these grievances and issues. And then you have these outbursts of manifestations because people feel like Well, hold on, we didn’t agree to something, our issues and our problems won’t resolve. So what I’m trying to argue is that this for that actually, if you don’t deal with this issue, we can just go to elections and solve issues is also detrimental to the contrary, as well. And I say that because I think what we’re seeing is an inability of the government to be able to want to deal with this issue, or these issues that are starting because maybe they don’t have the capacity or institutional experience the way to do it.
But this okay, let’s leave it when we get to lectures, then we’ll solve it. Hmm, that doesn’t solve issues, because actually what that does, is it exacerbates existing issues that already exist, already already there from before the elections, and brings them to the forefront during elections. And that is the most dangerous thing that you can do, particularly for African states where we have weak leadership, particularly leadership, that isn’t one that is true to the people, weak governance systems, but also weak institutional systems that hold the various leaders accountable. And so for me, the urge would be okay, how do we move away from just thinking as elections as the ultimate final solution to being a part of a democratic step that allows Africa to find what it defines as African democracy, as opposed to mean something that actually if we do elections, we solve everyone’s issues, and we somehow miraculously have democracy?
That isn’t going to work. And I think South Sudan has that problem, particularly peace agreements, where if you were ever to be at a peace agreement, it’s, well, peace has come because we’ve signed this thing and we’ve cut a cow. Well, that doesn’t solve issues, per se, it doesn’t solve this, you’ve got to put the steps in place, institutional governance, institutional systems, governance, how the state operates, and what the vision is, and the goal is, and if that is not defined now, then we will have a problem past elections.

Well, you make some very valid points there and I absolutely agree with you because it won’t work unless stability is in place to have elections like any other country that’s going through instability issues or conflict issues. Thank you again for your time and elaborating on South Sudan.

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